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1. INTRODUCTION
The scale and scope of the climate crisis calls for comprehensive nationwide efforts to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. New legislation, passed by Congress and signed by the
President, is the first and best option for climate action at the federal level. This could be a version
of the Green New Deal, a carbon tax, sectoral limits, an emissions cap with compliance trading, or
another approach. What matters most is that the legislation effectively cut the greenhouse gas
emissions driving the world’s temperatures ever higher. Unfortunately, the prospect for federal
legislation is uncertain, while strong and decisive action is needed now. A president committed to
tackling climate change will need a backup plan in case Congress remains gridlocked, one that
relies on existing statutes to achieve the deep emission reductions the science says we need.
Our book, Combating Climate Change with Section 115 of the Clean Air Act: Law and Policy
Rationales, describes what could be the backbone of such a plan.1 The book describes how the Clean
Air Act’s international air pollution provision -- Section 115 -- could be the basis for a federal
climate policy that allows the executive branch to synchronize the nation’s domestic emission
reduction efforts with its international climate commitments; authorizes the use of a broad range of
regulatory approaches, including market-based mechanisms; respects cooperative federalism by
giving EPA the responsibility to set emission reduction targets and states the authority to decide
how to achieve them; and is administratively simple. In effect, EPA’s international authority can
fill the gap between the emission reductions other federal and state programs can achieve and the
level of cuts required to meet the nation’s climate goals.
Section 115 is triggered when EPA both finds that emissions in the United States contribute
to air pollution that endangers public health or welfare in another country (the “endangerment
finding”) and determines that the other country provides “essentially the same rights with respect
to the prevention or control of air pollution occurring in that country as is given that country” by
Section 115 (the “reciprocity determination”).

In the case of climate change, both of these

prerequisites can be met.
1

The book, like this paper, is the result of years of collaborative efforts by scholars and lawyers at
some of the nation’s most respected centers for climate change and environmental law, with contributions
from other outstanding legal scholars, experienced lawyers from the Environmental Protection Agency and
the State Department, leading state regulators, and veterans of congressional climate battles.
Sabin Center | Emmett Institute | Policy Integrity
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Once triggered, Section 115 operates through state implementation plans (SIPs), the state
air pollution control programs that are the heart of the Clean Air Act. EPA’s role is to require the
states to revise their SIPs to the extent they are “inadequate to prevent or eliminate the
endangerment.” EPA can use Section 115 to set greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets
for the states, and the states can work together with EPA and other states to build upon their
existing initiatives to achieve these emission reductions in a cost-effective manner. If a state refuses
to revise its SIP, EPA can promulgate a federal implementation plan (FIP) for the state.
In a 2016 article, many of the book’s authors examined how EPA’s international air
pollution authority could help achieve the country’s climate change goals.2 Our updated analysis
makes important adjustments to the thinking in that article to reflect all that has happened in the
intervening years – including developments in the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), the U.S. Supreme Court, and U.S. politics. We dive deeper into the
key implementation issues that would face EPA and the states, and we explore ways to address the
various legal and policy issues that would arise. We show that the statutory language is robust
enough to empower EPA and the states to reduce U.S. emissions in line with our international
commitments, while providing sufficient guardrails to constrain and direct agency discretion.
Although Section 115 is not the only existing authority a future president and EPA administrator
can, should, or will rely on to address climate change, it is a powerful one, which provides the
authority and flexibility necessary to design a climate change program that can produce deep
emission reductions in an efficient and equitable manner.

2. WHY CONSIDER SECTION 115?
The world’s leading climate scientists warn that nations must reduce emissions of carbon
dioxide to net zero (and achieve steep reductions in other GHGs) by mid-century to avoid
catastrophic climate change.3 The United States must play a leading role in the global effort to
achieve this science-based target, starting with ambitious action at home. Yet this call to action has
2

Michael Burger, Ann Carlson, Michael Gerrard, Jayni Foley Hein, Jason Schwartz, Keith Benes,
Legal Pathways to Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, 28
Georgetown Environmental Law Journal 359 (2016).
3
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on 1.5 Celsius of Global Warming,
Summary for Policymakers at 12 (2018) (online at: https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/).
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been stymied by four primary arguments: (1) the science is unreliable; (2) unilateral U.S. action will
be ineffective and unfair to the United States; (3) combating climate change will cost too much; and
(4) a one-size-fits-all federal approach will hamstring the states. Section 115 provides a pathway for
achieving the necessary emission reductions while offering a compelling answer to each of these
objections.
Section 115’s prerequisites address the first two concerns. First, to invoke Section 115, EPA
will need to demonstrate that U.S. emissions are endangering other nations. Thus, a Section 115
climate program must rest on a reliable and robust scientific foundation. As described further in
Part 6, the global scientific consensus leaves no doubt that domestic emissions endanger the health
and welfare of people in foreign countries. Second, the requirement for a reciprocity determination
prevents unilateralism because it forces the United States to act in concert with other nations.
Reciprocity necessitates, as the drafters of Section 115 envisioned, “[i]nternational negotiations …
to provide reciprocal benefits for U.S. citizens.”4 This feature of Section 115 recognizes the need for
coordinated action and would ensure that U.S. domestic actions are matched by commensurate
efforts by other major emitting countries.
The language and structure of Section 115 address the latter two concerns. Section 115
minimizes compliance costs because it authorizes states to use a broad range of regulatory
approaches to reduce emissions, including the use of “economic incentives such as fees,
marketable permits, and auctions of emissions rights.”5 A coordinated Section 115 program that
harnesses market forces -- similar to the approach EPA has used to address the analogous problem
of interstate air pollution -- could greatly enhance the economic efficiency of regulatory
approaches to climate policy. At the same time, Section 115 respects state prerogatives because it
operates through SIPs, the cooperative federalism core of the Clean Air Act. During the Trump
administration, leadership on climate issues has fallen to state officials. Because Section 115 is
implemented through state plans, it allows states to build upon -- rather than displace -- their
existing initiatives. EPA can offer guidance to states through a model rule, which many states may
elect to follow. But EPA cannot dictate what regulatory approaches will be used in a state unless

4

Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Clean Air Act Amendments and Solid Waste
Disposal Act, at 6, 89th Cong. (May 14, 1965) (S. Rept. 89-192).
5
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A).
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EPA promulgates a federal implementation plan (FIP) for the state, which EPA can do only if the
state fails to submit a SIP that achieves the federal emission reduction targets. Under Section 115,
states can design programs that will enhance equity, protect low-income households, and further
other state public policy goals.
Section 115 has other important advantages, including administrative efficiency and broad
public health co-benefits. Dozens of types of emissions sources such as oil refineries, chemical
plants, iron and steel manufacturers, and cement plants emit large quantities of GHGs as well as
other harmful air pollutants. Addressing each source category through separate source-specific
rulemakings would be time-consuming and burdensome for EPA, states, and the regulated sources
alike, and this strategy has yet to deliver the promised air quality benefits in all communities.
Section 115 offers a more practical approach because it can cover multiple sectors in a single
federal regulatory proceeding. The deep greenhouse gas emission reductions that Section 115
enables will necessarily be accompanied by large reductions in emissions that cause ozone and
particulate pollution, as well as air toxics. This can save lives and reduce illness in communities
across the country, and especially in the most polluted, reducing long-standing air quality
inequities.
Moreover, Section 115 is compatible with a broad array of other initiatives at both the
federal and state level.

A new administration may find it advisable to diversify its policy

approaches through a combination of administrative actions using authorities deployed by the
Obama Administration and new programs, potentially including new spending, tax, or regulatory
policies enacted by Congress. Given the magnitude of emission reductions required, however, a
significant “emissions gap” may well exist between what the other programs can achieve and what
is needed to keep warming below dangerous levels. Section 115 can fill that gap and put us on a
track to meet our national emission reduction objectives.
This combination of favorable attributes is unique to Section 115, the “International Air
Pollution” provision of the Clean Air Act. If comprehensive climate legislation proves impossible
to enact, Section 115 could be one of the most attractive options in the regulatory toolbox for
tackling the climate crisis.

Sabin Center | Emmett Institute | Policy Integrity
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3. AN UNEXPECTED LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
HISTORY
Section 115 was enacted in 1965 by a Congress that had a remarkably prescient
understanding of the dangers of climate change. That year, President Lyndon Johnson’s “Special
Message to the Congress on Conservation and Restoration of Natural Beauty” urged Congress to
strengthen the nation’s air pollution laws and warned:

Air pollution is no longer confined to isolated places. This generation has altered the
composition of the atmosphere on a global scale through … a steady increase in carbon
dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels.6
These concerns were echoed by statements on the floor of the House and Senate.7 The
President’s Science Advisory Committee released a landmark report in 1965 entitled “Restoring the
Quality of Our Environment” with a chapter on “Carbon Dioxide from Fossil Fuels – The Invisible
Pollutant,” which admonished that “Man is unwittingly conducting a vast geophysical
experiment” and predicted “measurable and perhaps marked changes in climate” by the year
2000. 8 There was even testimony by a member of Congress before the House Energy and
Commerce Committee on the legislation that included Section 115 stating that “air pollution …
includes carbon dioxide” and that climate change is “[a]n effect of pollution” that “may in time
melt the polar icecaps … thus dangerously shrinking the earth’s land surface area.”9
According to its drafters, the purpose of Section 115 is to enable “cooperative action with
foreign countries” to address international air pollution that is “endangering the health or

6

President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on Conservation and Restoration of
Natural Beauty (February 8, 1965).
7
E.g., Statement of Senator Joseph Clark, 111 Cong. Rec. 11104 (May 20, 1965) (“We poison
ourselves with our own wastes by dumping into the atmosphere vast quantities of … carbon dioxide”).
8
Environmental Pollution Panel of the President’s Science Advisory Committee, Restoring the
Quality of Our Environment, p. 126-27 (November 1965).
9
Subcommittee on Public Health of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1965: Hearings on H.R. 463, H.R. 2105, H.R. 4001, H.R. 7065, H.R. 7394,
H.R. 7429, H.R. 8007, H.R. 8398, H.R. 8723, H.R. 8800, and S. 306, pp. 80, 81-82 (June 1965) (Ser. No. 8919).
Sabin Center | Emmett Institute | Policy Integrity
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welfare.”10 As originally enacted, Section 115 was enforced through an abatement conference
procedure, which provided a forum for the impacted foreign nations to discuss international air
pollution with the relevant U.S. and state agencies. In 1977, Congress strengthened Section 115 by
changing the enforcement mechanism to SIPs, which operate under Section 110 of the Clean Air
Act. As the Senate report explained, an EPA endangerment finding and reciprocity determination
“will require the State in which the source of those emissions is located to revise its
implementation plan to control those emissions.”11 Foreign governments retained their right to
participate in the SIP revision process.
Section 115 was first invoked not long after the 1977 amendments, in the waning days of
President Jimmy Carter’s administration. EPA Administrator Douglas Costle announced in two
letters his findings that air pollution in the United States contributed to acid rain, which
endangered public health and welfare in Canada, and that Canada’s environmental laws provided
the United States with essentially the same rights that Section 115 provided to Canada. A decade of
litigation and regulatory maneuvering between proponents and opponents of limiting power
plants’ sulfur dioxide emissions followed. Eventually, two decisions were issued by the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals, which can be distilled into two key concepts. First, action under Section
115 must comport with the rulemaking requirements set forth in the Administrative Procedure
Act.12 Second, EPA has the discretion to wait to issue an endangerment finding under Section 115
until it can develop a plan to “prevent or eliminate” that endangerment, though it is not compelled
to do so.13
Section 115 lay largely dormant until 2008, when the George W. Bush EPA sought comment
in an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on which of several Clean Air authorities, among
them Section 115, should be used to regulate GHGs.14 Among the comments the agency received
were several from industry groups asserting that Section 115 would be the provision in the Clean

10

Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Clean Air Act Amendments and Solid Waste
Disposal Act, pp. 4, 6 (May 14, 1965) (S. Rept. 89-192).
11
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, p. 57
(May 10, 1977) (S. Rept. 95-127).
12
Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
13
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. EPA, 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
14
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean Air Act, 73
Fed. Reg. 44482 (July 30, 2008).
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Air Act best suited to address climate change. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example,
commented that it could “provide the basis for an equitable, common sense approach.”15
When EPA acted to regulate GHGs under the Obama Administration, it chose to use other
authorities, principally Section 111 for select stationary sources and Section 202 for motor vehicles.
These regulatory decisions, however, were made prior to the 2015 Paris Agreement, which adds an
important new factor to the legal landscape. As described in Part 7, the Paris Agreement reinforces
the foundation for the reciprocity determination that Section 115 requires. Moreover, a new
administration would not need to choose between Section 115, Section 111, and Section 202; rather,
they can be deployed together in complementary and harmonized ways, as Part 10.d discusses.

4. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Two principles guide the legal analysis summarized here and described in further detail in
our book, Combating Climate Change with Section 115 of the Clean Air Act. First, any contemplated
action under Section 115 must take into account the potential for Supreme Court review. Given the
Court’s shifting approach to judicial review of agency actions, it is unclear whether regulation
under Section 115 would be reviewed under the traditional, deferential Chevron standard, under
the “major questions” exception to Chevron that the Court has inconsistently invoked, or under
some new rubric advocated by the Court’s recent appointments. We also do not know the extent to
which the Court would accord EPA’s interpretation of Section 115 the broad deference
traditionally extended in the sphere of international relations, though it seems plain that such
deference should apply.16 Given these uncertainties, any action under Section 115 should be based
on carefully reasoned and appropriately constrained interpretations closely tied to the statutory
language.
15

Chamber of Commerce, Comments on Regulating Greenhouse Gases under the Clean Air Act
(November 26, 2008) (comment on EPA Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, docket ID EPA-HQOAR-2008-0318); see also Comments of the American Forest and Paper Association on Regarding
Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act 5 (November 26, 2008); Comments of the
Portland Cement Association on Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act 5
(November 26, 2008).
16
E.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (“congressional
legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must
often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not
be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved”).
Sabin Center | Emmett Institute | Policy Integrity
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Second, Section 115 must be construed in a way that gives the provision purpose and effect.
With the exception of an important threshold question -- are GHGs an “air pollutant” for purposes
of Section 115? -- the major interpretative questions we address are not unique to climate change.
Even in a paradigmatic case of toxic emissions from a single state endangering health in Canada or
Mexico, EPA would need to formulate an approach for assessing reciprocity and a method for
setting the state’s emission reduction target.
Applying both of these principles, we offer interpretations of Section 115 that can both
ensure its effectiveness in reducing international air pollution, whether involving GHGs or other
pollutants, and survive fair-minded judicial review, whether deferential or searching.

5. THE MEANING OF “ANY AIR POLLUTANT”
An effort to invoke Section 115 in the climate change context must address a crucial
threshold question: Can Section 115 regulate emissions of greenhouse gases? Section 115 applies to
“any air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United States” that “cause or contribute to air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign
country.” A textual analysis clearly indicates that this applies to GHGs. “Air pollutant” is defined
in the statute as “any air pollution agent or combination of agents … which is emitted into or

otherwise enters the ambient air.” 17 “Welfare” is defined in the statute to include “effects
on…climate.”18 The plain meaning of the statute is that Section 115 can regulate GHGs.
At the same time, Supreme Court precedents make clear that the interpretation of “any air
pollutant” in the Clean Air Act can depend on the statutory context. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the
Court interpreted Section 202’s requirement that EPA regulate the emissions of “any air pollutant”
from motor vehicles that “cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” holding that the reference to “any air pollutant”
includes GHGs.19 But in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, where the Court interpreted the term
“any air pollutant” in the definition of “major emitting facility” in the Act’s prevention of
significant deterioration provisions, the Court reached the opposite conclusion, citing the concern
17

42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
Id.
19
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
18
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that including GHGs would have extended EPA’s permit authority to millions of previously
uncovered smaller sources.20
The argument for applying the Massachusetts v. EPA precedent to Section 115 is
straightforward. The phrase “any air pollutant” is used in Section 115 in exactly the same context
as in the provision before the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA: in both cases, “any air pollutant” is
part of an endangerment clause that triggers a regulatory obligation. If harm to public health and
welfare in the United States can trigger an obligation to regulate GHGs under Section 202, as the
Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA, harm to public health and welfare in a foreign country should
likewise trigger an obligation to regulate the same pollutants under Section 115.
The decision in UARG recognized that “[o]ne ordinarily assumes ‘that identical words used
in the same act are intended to have the same meaning.’”21 It justified deviating from this usual
rule of construction because of the “calamitous consequences” of requiring millions of small
sources to obtain air pollution permits for the first time.22 In the case of Section 115, however, no
such “calamitous consequences” would result. To the contrary, addressing GHGs under Section
115 results in GHG emissions being regulated by states through the SIP process that is the
cooperative federalism heart of the Clean Air Act. There is no requirement that millions of small
sources obtain permits or otherwise be regulated. Indeed, as explained in Part 8.b, EPA’s targets
for states under Section 115 can be based on the reductions achievable from large stationary
sources and fuel distributors, which are already regulated by EPA and the states under the Clean
Air Act. The result of regulating GHGs under Section 115 would thus be the exact opposite of the
regulatory trainwreck described in UARG: a sensible, cost-effective, and equitable program for
reducing GHGs consistent with the nation’s international commitments.
In its recent decision in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, the Court confronted the argument
that the settlement provision of the Superfund law could not be interpreted to make landowners
potentially responsible parties because Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes.” Writing
for a six-member majority, Chief Justice Roberts held that the provision was “less a mousehole and

20

134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
134 S. Ct. at 2441.
22
134 S. Ct. at 2442.
21
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more a watering hole – exactly the sort of place we would expect to find this elephant.”23 Precisely
the same can be said about Section 115. If the Clean Air Act applies to the gases that cause climate
change, as Massachusetts v. EPA held that it does, the most likely place in the Act to find the
authority to address this international air pollution problem would be the Clean Air Act’s
“International Air Pollution” provision, Section 115.
The conclusion that “any air pollutant” in Section 115 applies to GHGs is bolstered by
another recent decision of the Court, Bostock v. Clayton County, which held that the 1964 Civil
Rights Act prohibits discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation and gender status.
In his majority opinion, Justice Gorsuch held that the Court “interprets a statute in accord with the
public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment,” not “the limits of the drafters’
imagination.”24 Section 115 was enacted just one year after the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Not only is
it similarly “written in starkly broad terms,”25 but the legislative history shows that both the
President and members of Congress expressly understood that “air pollution” includes carbon
dioxide, the principle greenhouse gas.26
During the George W. Bush administration, EPA rejected a request by a Canadian
environmental group to regulate GHG emissions under Section 115, reasoning that the SIP process
triggered by Section 115 was limited exclusively to achieving the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) for listed “criteria” pollutants.27 This narrow reading is erroneous for multiple
reasons, including the express requirement in Section 110 that SIPs comply with Section 115,28 the
Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in UARG that SIPs can regulate GHG emissions from large
“anyway” sources already subject to permitting requirements (and thus are not limited to NAAQS
pollutants),29 and the legislative history of Section 115.30 In a new administration, EPA would be

23

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, 140 S. Ct. 1335, 1355 (2020).
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct 1731, 1737-38, 1753 (2020).
25
140 S.Ct. at 1753.
26
See Part 3.
27
Letter from Brian McLean, Dir., Office of Atmospheric Programs, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, to Albert Kochl, Staff Attorney, Ecojustice Canada (February 29, 2008); see also U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Greenhouse Gases Under
the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,482–83 (July 30, 2008).
28
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(ii).
29
134 S. Ct. at 2448.
30
There are numerous reasons why limiting Section 115 to criteria pollutants would conflict with the
legislative history, including (1) criteria pollutants and NAAQS did not exist when Section 115 was enacted
24

Sabin Center | Emmett Institute | Policy Integrity

10

Combating Climate Change with Section 115 of the Clean Air Act

amply justified in reading “any air pollutant” in Section 115 as including the emissions causing the
world’s most serious international air pollution problem.

6. THE ENDANGERMENT FINDING
Section 115 provides two options for finding endangerment: (1) the EPA Administrator
may find that “any air pollutant or pollutants emitted into the United States cause or contribute to
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health and welfare in a
foreign country” or (2) the Secretary of State may request that the Administrator make an
endangerment finding “with respect to such pollution which the Secretary of State alleges is of
such a nature.” The first option mirrors the endangerment finding EPA previously made under
Section 202 for motor vehicles,31 except the emissions the agency may consider under Section 115
are all U.S. GHG emissions, not just those from motor vehicles, and the endangerment must occur
in foreign countries, not the United States. The case for finding foreign endangerment under this
option is irrefutable. The consensus science conveyed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change and other authoritative sources details the extraordinary levels of climate risk to which
countries are now exposed.32
EPA’s endangerment determination under Section 202 found endangerment both at current
levels of GHGs in the atmosphere and at projected future levels, and EPA could take the same
approach here. In that previous determination, however, the endangerment finding had no bearing
on the level of required emission reductions because these were determined under a technologybased standard. Section 115 is different. The SIP revisions that an endangerment finding triggers
are supposed to be adequate to “prevent or eliminate the endangerment.” Finding that warming at
in 1965; (2) early actions under the virtually identical interstate provisions of Section 115 applied to a wide
range of pollutants, including odors from a rendering plant, hydrogen sulfide gases, and chlorine compounds
and eye irritants, none of which at the time or subsequently were criteria pollutants subject to a NAAQS; (3)
from 1970 until 1977 (when the interstate provisions of Section 115 were repealed), the interstate provisions
expressly provided that they did not apply to “an air pollutant for which … a national primary or secondary
ambient air quality standard is in effect”; and (4) the Senate report for the 1990 Clean Air Amendments,
which added the requirement that SIPs comply with Section 115, explicitly recognized that “Section 115 of
the Clean Air Act … is not limited to meeting the NAAQS.” U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, p. 291 (December 20, 1989) (S. Rep. 101-228).
31
74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (December 15, 2009).
32
E.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on 1.5 Celsius of Global
Warming, Summary for Policymakers (2018) (online at: https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/).
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a specific level -- say at 1.5 or 2 degrees C -- causes endangerment could be one way to provide the
agency with a guide for determining the level of state emission reductions to require under Section
115.
The second endangerment option could provide a pathway for such a finding. It authorizes
the Secretary of State to request an endangerment finding with respect to pollution that the
Secretary “alleges” causes endangerment. This statutory language would appear to allow the
Secretary to allege that 1.5 or 2 degrees C of warming causes endangerment, especially if this
request were guided by reciprocity considerations and the Secretary’s intimate knowledge of the
actions of other nations. EPA would need to conduct a rigorous analysis to confirm that foreign
endangerment exists at the level alleged by the Secretary. Assuming EPA is able to confirm the
endangerment -- which would surely be the case -- EPA could then issue an endangerment finding
at the level alleged by the Secretary.

7. THE RECIPROCITY DETERMINATION
The second prerequisite to action under Section 115 is a determination by the
Administrator that “a foreign country … has given the United States essentially the same rights
with respect to the prevention or control of air pollution occurring in that country as is given that
country by this section.”
When Section 115 was first enacted in 1965, its enforcement mechanism involved multiple
procedural steps. First, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (there was no EPA at the
time) would convene an “abatement conference” at which the relevant local, state, and interstate
agencies would discuss measures to address the international pollution problem. If the conference
did not produce adequate results, the Secretary could convene a hearing before a board appointed
by the Secretary, the affected states, and other federal agencies with substantial interests. If the
hearing board agreed with the Secretary that additional abatement was necessary, the Secretary
could ask the Attorney General to initiate legal action. Section 115 expressly guaranteed foreign
countries the right to participate at each step in the process, providing that “the foreign country
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which may be adversely affected … shall, for purpose of the conference and any further
proceeding …, have all the rights of a State air pollution control agency.”33
When Section 115 was amended in 1977, the abatement conference process was replaced
with enforcement through SIPs, but the language of the reciprocity provision was not changed.
The only express “right” the amended language provides a foreign country is the right “to appear
at any public hearing associated with the revision of the … applicable implementation plan.” Read
literally, the reciprocity requirement in Section 115 could be satisfied if foreign countries provide
the United States with “essentially the same rights” to participate in their regulatory process.
This “procedural reciprocity” would be satisfied by the participatory rights provided under
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the enhanced
transparency framework established in the Paris Agreement. The procedural rights provided
under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement exceed the right to attend a public hearing provided
in Section 115. Under these international regimes, countries mutually submit to biennial country
reporting requirements, reviews by panels of technical experts, and the opportunity for each
nation to participate in a “facilitative, multilateral consideration” of other countries’ emission
reduction commitments, which provides each country the chance to make comments and raise
questions about the other countries’ emission reduction efforts.34
The requirement that a foreign country provide the U.S. with “essentially the same rights
with respect to the prevention or control of air pollution” could also be interpreted to necessitate a
reciprocal commitment by other nations to substantive reductions in GHG pollution within their
borders. An analysis of whether commitments by other nations can satisfy this “substantive
reciprocity” must address three questions: (1) How can EPA determine whether the commitments
of another nation are substantively reciprocal? (2) How many, and which, other nations must make
substantively reciprocal commitments to trigger Section 115? (3) What form must the commitments
of the other nations take?
33

(1965).

Clean Air Act Amendments and Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, section 102

34

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, “Modalities, procedures and
guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris
Agreement,” printed in UNFCCC “Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to the Paris Agreement on the third part of its first session, held in Katowice from 2 to 15 December
2018” as Annex to Decision 18/CMA.1, available at : https://unfccc.int/documents/193408.
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Regarding the first question, there is no single way to assess the equivalency of country
efforts. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has identified multiple “effortsharing approaches” for fairly allocating emissions reduction obligations among nations. These
approaches include “responsibility,” which would apportion emission reductions based on a
country’s historical emissions; “capability,” which would apportion emission reductions based on
a measure of a country’s ability to pay; “equality,” which would apportion emission reductions
based on per-capita emissions; and “equal marginal abatement costs,” which would apportion
emission reductions based on a measure of reduction costs.35 According to Climate Action Tracker,
which has developed a methodology that merges these factors for comparing national climate
commitments, the current U.S. effort is “critically insufficient,” the lowest possible rating and
worse than 80% of the other nations evaluated, including major emitters such as China, the EU,
India, Japan, and Brazil.36 If this assessment is accurate, there is ample room for the United States
to increase its ambition significantly without exceeding the reciprocal efforts of many, if not the
large majority of, other countries. Given the foreign policy context for any reciprocity
determination and the complex economic, equity, and historical considerations involved, courts
should defer to a reasonable assessment by EPA.
Regarding the second question -- the number and identity of countries needed to trigger
reciprocity -- the statutory language provides that reciprocity can be satisfied by the actions of a
single country. It does not limit applicability to neighboring countries, or to any other subset or
category of foreign nations. It also does not address whether the country could be found to be
acting reciprocally if its emission reductions provide no measurable impact in the United States, as
could happen if the nation in question were a small emitter located far from the United States.
According to the legislative history, however, the purpose of the reciprocity requirement is to
ensure that U.S. citizens receive “reciprocal benefit.”37 If EPA followed this guidance, reciprocal
commitments by an individual country with large emissions, such as China, or groups of
countries, such as the European Union, should pass a substantive reciprocity test. The collective

35

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group III, Mitigation Of Climate Change,
§§ 4.6.2, 6.3.6.6 (2014).
36
Climate Action Tracker, Countries, available at https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/.
37
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Clean Air Act Amendments and Solid Waste
Disposal Act, at 6, 89th Cong. (May 14, 1965) (S. Rept. 89-192).
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commitments made under the Paris Agreement present an even more self-evident case. In these
instances, the emission reductions of the other countries would provide the “reciprocal benefit” to
U.S. citizens that the legislative drafters envisioned. In contrast, a reciprocity determination based
on a single small country whose efforts would not provide a reciprocal benefit might not meet the
test.
Regarding the final question – the form that the substantive commitments of other nations
must take – Section 115 is silent. There is no requirement that they be expressed in a treaty,
executive agreement, domestic statute, agency regulation, or some other executive or
administrative order. Other nations’ Paris commitments should be an adequate basis for satisfying
substantive reciprocity since they express the contribution that each country has pledged to make
to the global effort to reduce GHG emissions. To provide additional support for its determination,
the administration could negotiate new bilateral or multilateral agreements with most or all of the
world’s other major emitting countries. In these agreements, each nation could separately commit
to implement its Paris pledge if the other nation or nations do. Such agreements would be binding
under international law.38 They would cover the vast majority of global GHG emissions and
would be a firm foundation for a reciprocity determination.

8. THE SIP PROCESS: EPA RESPONSIBILITIES
Once the prerequisites for action under Section 115 are met, EPA would need to take
several key actions to implement the program. These include issuance of the SIP call, allocation of
emission reductions obligations among the states, and promulgation of a model rule that states
could opt into and a federal implementation plan for states that refuse to adopt a Section 115 plan.

8.1 THE SIP CALL
One of the key interpretive issues that EPA must address to implement Section 115 is how
the provision guides EPA in calling upon states to revise their state implementation plans. The
statutory language provides that if the Administrator makes a foreign endangerment finding and
reciprocity determination, each state with emissions contributing to the endangerment must revise

38

Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, arts. 11-12.
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“so much of the applicable implementation plan as is inadequate to prevent or eliminate the
endangerment.” There are at least four approaches that EPA could use, individually or in
combination, to craft an effective SIP call: a “reciprocity-based” approach, a “contribution-based”
approach, a “cost-based” approach, and an “endangerment-based” approach. Each of these
approaches relies on different parts of the statutory text to authorize reasonable action bounded by
constraints on agency discretion.
A “reciprocity-based” approach would align the level of U.S. reductions under Section 115
with the efforts of other nations. It relies on the concept that EPA has no authority under Section
115 to require a level of reductions that is disproportionate to the commitments of other nations
because in that case reciprocity would no longer exist. Under the Paris Agreement, nations have
pledged to take “ambitious action” aimed at “[h]olding the increase in the global average
temperature to well below 2 degree C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5 degree C above pre-industrial levels.”39 Under a reciprocity-based
approach, Section 115 SIP calls could not require deeper emission reductions than consistent with
this range of ambition.
A “contribution-based” approach would require states to eliminate their contribution to
dangerous climate change over time. Section 115 recognizes that endangerment can exist when
U.S. emissions “contribute to” air pollution problems in other nations, even where they are not the
sole cause. In such a situation, the most that the United States could do is halt its contribution to
the international endangerment. Since there is no deadline in Section 115, EPA could direct states
to reduce emissions on a schedule consistent with reaching net zero U.S. GHG emissions by a
reasonable date, such as 2050. There is precedent for such an approach: in its regional haze
regulations, EPA gave the states over 60 years to achieve the goal of eliminating emissions that
impair vistas in national parks.40

39

United Nations, Paris Agreement, Article 2, para 1(a) (2015) (online at: https://unfccc.int/processand-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement).
40
40 CFR 51.308(d)(1) (requiring SIPs to calculate reasonable further progress based on the rate of
improvement that would be needed to reach natural visibility conditions by 2064). EPA would not need to
mandate a schedule to achieve net zero emissions in a single rulemaking. Multiple D.C. Circuit opinions
have recognized a “one-step-at-a-time doctrine” under which an agency can engage in incremental
rulemakings so long as it can “articulate (1) what it believes the statute requires and (2) how it intends to
achieve that goal.” Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 772 F.3d 401, 410 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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A “cost-based” approach would closely resemble how EPA has addressed the analogous
problem of interstate air pollution, where the agency has issued a succession of rules requiring
upwind states to reduce nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide based on reasonable cost thresholds.41
The agency’s position would be that any SIP that does not require cost-effective emission
reductions is “inadequate” to prevent or eliminate endangerment. If the cost-based SIP calls were
challenged for not requiring a greater level of reductions, EPA would have several possible
responses. As in a contribution-based approach, the agency could take the position that its ultimate
objective is net-zero emissions and that it is using cost considerations to determine the schedule for
achieving the net-zero goal. Alternatively, EPA could interpret the word “prevent” in “prevent or
eliminate the endangerment” to mean “to hinder” or “to impede,” 42 and use cost-based
considerations to determine the degree to which states must hinder or impede climate change in
the SIP revision.43
An “endangerment-based” approach would be available to EPA if the agency’s
endangerment finding were based on an allegation by the Secretary of State that warming above a
certain threshold -- such as 1.5 or 2 degrees C -- endangers other nations, as is discussed in Part 6.
Under this approach, EPA’s Section 115 SIP calls would resemble its Section 110 SIP calls for states
that are not meeting a national ambient air quality standard. In the well-established NAAQS
context, EPA sets the air quality standard and then directs the state to develop a plan
demonstrating how it will achieve the standard. In making this demonstration, the states can take
into account the projected effects of other federal programs and actions in other states. Similarly
here, the endangerment level could be translated into a schedule of emission reductions that the

41

E.g., U.S. EPA, Cross-State Air Pollution Rule Update for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS; Final Rule,
81 Fed. Reg. 74054 (Oct. 26, 2016); U.S. EPA, Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine
Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 48207 (Aug. 8,
2011); U.S. EPA, Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone
Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg.
57356 (Oct. 27, 1998).
42
See Hinder, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
43
Interpreting the word “prevent” in Section 115 to mean “to hinder” or “to impede” would make
Section 115 similar to Section 211(c), which regulates fuels, and Section 231, which regulates aircraft
engines. In both of these provisions, Congress has provided EPA with “broad discretion,” Union Oil v. EPA,
821 F.2d 678, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and “expansive authority,” National Association of Clean Air Agencies
v. EPA, 489 F3d 1221, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2007), to reduce emissions following an endangerment finding.
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state plans would need to achieve to prevent the endangerment from occurring, taking into
account the impact of other federal and state actions and the commitments of other nations.

8.2. ALLOCATION DECISIONS
As part of the SIP calls, EPA must determine how much of the aggregate nationwide
emission reductions needed to prevent or eliminate endangerment must be achieved by states
under Section 115 and how much can be achieved through other measures. The executive branch
has numerous options for reducing GHG emissions. For example, EPA can issue source-specific
regulations; the Department of Energy can promulgate energy efficiency standards; and the
Department of Agriculture can adopt programs to reduce agricultural emissions. So long as EPA
can demonstrate that the sum of the emission reductions that states are required to achieve
through their Section 115 SIPs and the emission reductions the federal government will achieve
under other programs is together sufficient to prevent or eliminate the endangerment, EPA would
be able to find that in combination with the other programs, the SIPs are not “inadequate” under
Section 115.
For example, California has demonstrated that a broad cap-and-trade system for GHGs can
cover 80% to 90% of the state’s GHG inventory by regulating large stationary sources and fuel
distributors.44 EPA could base its SIP calls on a similar universe of sources. Such an approach
would allow states the option to follow California’s example and capitalize on their authority
under Section 115 to use “economic incentives such as fees, marketable permits, and auctions of
emission rights.” 45 It would also avoid requiring states to regulate the multitude of small
previously unregulated sources that the Supreme Court found objectionable in UARG. If
additional emission reductions are needed from other sources, such as agriculture or oil and gas
wells, EPA could rely on other federal programs to control these emissions.
EPA must also decide how to allocate the aggregate emission reductions to be achieved
through Section 115 among the individual states. This is similar to the decision EPA has made
several times under the “Good Neighbor” provision of the Clean Air Act, which requires upwind
44

California Air Resources Board, Overview of ARB Emissions Trading Program (October 20,
2011) (online at https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/2011/cap_trade_overview.pdf).
45
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A).
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states to reduce the emissions contributing significantly to nonattainment in downwind states. In
EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, the Supreme Court held that because the language of the Good
Neighbor provision did not address the issue, EPA had authority to choose a reasonable approach.
The Court stated:

How is EPA to divide responsibility among the … States? Should the Agency allocate
reductions proportionally … , on a per capita basis, on the basis of the cost of abatement, or
by some other metric? … The Good Neighbor Provision does not answer that question for
EPA. … [W]e read Congress’ silence as a delegation of authority to EPA to select from
among reasonable options.46
Like the Good Neighbor provision at issue in Homer City, Section 115 also does not specify
how EPA must allocate responsibility to control air pollution among multiple contributing states,
and EPA necessarily must exercise its discretion to choose a reasonable approach. Some allocation
approaches, such as equal percent reductions from a baseline year, would favor states that have
not yet acted to reduce GHG emissions, while others, such as equalizing the marginal cost of
reductions in each state (which is the approach EPA selected and the Court upheld in Homer City),
would benefit the early acting states. The agency can use its discretion to identify allocations that
can appropriately balance competing equity and efficiency considerations.

8.3. THE MODEL RULE AND THE FIP
In the interstate transport rulemakings, EPA supplemented its SIP calls by promulgating a
model rule that willing states could adopt and a federal implementation plan (FIP) that EPA would
apply in states that refused to comply with the Good Neighbor provision. The agency could take a
similar approach under Section 115.
While states remain free to develop their own regulatory program designs, providing an
optional model rule can facilitate state compliance with the SIP call and EPA review and approval
of the state submissions for the states that choose to adopt it. It can also promote uniformity across
state programs, which can lower compliance costs for regulated sources. In the interstate transport
rulemakings, the model rules relied on market-based cap-and-trade programs. They were adopted
46

572 U.S. 489, 514-15 (2014).
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by all states and successfully lowered emissions to the required levels.47 A Section 115 model rule
that followed the approach of the interstate transport model rules could build upon those
successful experiences and take advantage of their cost-saving features. A model rule could also
include equity-oriented provisions similar to those in New York’s Climate Leadership and
Community Protection Act, which requires that the implementing regulations “ensure that
activities undertaken to comply with the regulations do not result in a net increase in co-pollutant
emissions or otherwise disproportionately burden disadvantaged communities.”48 If there were
interest from states in pursuing other regulatory approaches, such as emission fees or clean energy
mandates, EPA could consider issuing a suite of model rules for states to consider.
If a state fails to submit an approvable SIP by the applicable Clean Air Act deadlines, EPA
must issue a FIP to regulate that state’s sources directly.49 Under the statute, the FIP must “fill all or
a portion of a gap or otherwise correct all or a portion of an inadequacy in a State implementation
plan” and may include “economic incentives, such as marketable permits or auctions of emissions
allowances.”50 In the interstate transport rulemakings, the FIPs closely followed the designs of the
model rules, and EPA could take the same approach in its Section 115 FIP.

9. THE SIP PROCESS: STATE RESPONSIBILITIES
Section 115 is a state-friendly approach to reducing U.S. GHG emissions. In the absence of a
comprehensive federal climate program, many states have become leaders in the effort to combat
climate change, adopting innovative policies such as clean energy standards, demand-side
efficiency to lower consumer energy bills, cap-and-trade programs, clean fuel requirements, smartgrowth initiatives, and community reinvestment programs. A federal Section 115 rule could
supplement and strengthen these existing programs without supplanting them. It would also level
the playing field among states by requiring every state to reduce GHG emissions.

47

See, e.g., EPA, The NOx Budget Trading Program: 2008 Highlights, at 1, 3 (October 2009) (online
at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/2008_highlights.pdf).
48
N.Y. Environmental Conservation Law 75-0109(3)(c).
49
States have 18 months after the Section 115 SIP calls to submit their revisions to EPA for review.
42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5). EPA then has 60 days to determine whether the state submissions are complete and
an additional 12 months to approve or deny the submissions. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(1), (2). If EPA disapproves
a SIP, the agency has up to two years to issue a FIP for the state. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1).
50
42 U.S.C. § 7602(7e).
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States would have two primary options for complying with Section 115. First, states could
elect to adopt the EPA model rule, with or without state-specific modifications. This is how states
have complied with EPA’s interstate transport rules, and it would considerably reduce the
administrative burden on state authorities while also promoting greater uniformity and coherence
in GHG reduction programs. Widespread adoption of the model rule could become a pathway to a
coordinated, national response to climate change that would provide greater certainty for
regulated sources and lower costs for the economy.
Alternatively, states could develop their own regulatory approaches, much as states
currently do when they submit SIPs to implement the national ambient air quality standards.
Under this “state-led” approach, a state would need to develop control measures that yield
emission reductions that are quantifiable, nonduplicative, verifiable, and enforceable and would
result in total state emissions at or below the target level. States would also need to develop
alternative strategies for interstate cooperation if they wanted to submit multi-state compliance
plans. There is ample precedent from the NAAQS context that states and EPA could draw upon to
guide and evaluate these submissions.

10. OTHER KEY REGULATORY DESIGN ISSUES
A Section 115 program would also need to address several other key design issues to ensure a
robust framework for agency action is put in place. These issues include how to address emissions from
transportation fuels and commercial and residential use of natural gas, standards for any allowed offsets,
protection against emissions leakage and mitigation of potential impacts on international
competitiveness, and integration with other federal action under the Clean Air Act, including Section 111
regulation of existing power plants.

10.1. TRANSPORTATION FUELS AND NATURAL GAS
The combustion of fossil fuels for transportation is now the largest contributor to total
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States, accounting for 28% of total emissions. 51
Complementing continuing federal and state adoption of tailpipe GHG emissions standards,
51
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Section 115 would enable states to develop implementation plans that include the emissions from
combustion of transportation fuels. The most attractive option might be to integrate transportation
fuels into a cross-sectoral, market-based trading program, thus achieving the cost-savings and
efficiency of a universal cap. California’s cap-and-trade system, which requires suppliers to hold
allowances equivalent to the carbon content of the fuels they distribute for use in the state, could
serve as a model.52 A coalition of nine northeastern and mid-Atlantic states is considering a similar
approach to reduce carbon emissions from transportation fuels.53 Alternatively, state and federal
policymakers could consider carbon taxes, performance standards, and other policy mechanisms
to secure transportation and consumer natural gas emissions reductions in a Section 115 regime.
Residential and commercial use of natural gas is also a significant source of GHG
emissions, responsible for approximately 10% of U.S. emissions. 54 In California, natural gas
distributors are required to hold allowances for the natural gas delivered to customers.55 States
could adopt a similar approach under Section 115 and could handle emissions from oil used for
space heating in the same fashion.

10.2. OFFSETS
Offsets, which enable a pollution source that is subject to regulatory emissions standards to
earn credit for the emissions reductions or sequestrations achieved by an actor not covered under
the same regulatory scheme, are often a component of and always a consideration for emissions
trading programs. Properly designed, real, and verifiable offsets offer flexibility that can lower the
compliance costs of a market-based regulatory approach, and possibly stimulate innovative
emissions reductions in unregulated sectors, while still achieving the overall emissions target. If
states adopt cap-and-trade programs to implement Section 115, EPA and the states will have to
address whether Section 115 permits the use of offsets, and whether EPA could impose quality- or
quantity-based restrictions on the use of offsets in state implementation plans under Section 115.

52

See 17 CAL. CODE REGS. § 95910.
TRANSPORTATION AND CLIMATE INITIATIVE, Framework for a Draft Regional Policy Proposal,
https://www.transportationandclimate.org/sites/default/files/TCI-Framework_10-01-2019.pdf (last visited
Dec. 2, 2019).
54
Id. at ES-12, tbl. ES-3.
55
See 17 CAL. CODE REGS. § 95852.
53
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There are two different types of offsets: (1) offsets that reduce emissions of GHGs, such as
offsets that capture methane emissions from dairy farms, and (2) offsets that sequester emissions,
such as offsets from growing trees or capturing carbon in the soil. These offsets can occur in three
different locations – in state, out-of-state, and internationally – creating six different potential
categories of offsets. EPA should have ample authority to require that any offsets meet stringent
quality standards that ensure that only real, verifiable offsets will be credited toward compliance.
EPA could also create a model offset program with EPA-approved offsets and potentially limits on
the offset quantity that states could opt to use, which could be an attractive option for many states.
EPA may also have authority, if it so chooses, to prohibit the use of any offsets except instate emission reduction offsets. EPA’s rationale for prohibiting states from using these offsets
could be that Section 115 requires states to reduce their emissions of GHGs, not to offset them with
reductions occurring outside of the state or through measures that remove pollutants from the
atmosphere.56

10.3. LEAKAGE AND COMPETITIVENESS
The risk of carbon leakage is a primary concern in addressing nationwide GHG emissions,
both to ensure emissions reductions are realized and to address concerns that such a policy could
have an adverse economic effect. Carbon leakage occurs when economic activity that emits carbon
dioxide relocates from a jurisdiction that has adopted climate change mitigation policies to another
jurisdiction that has not.
President Donald Trump’s aggressive use of trade authorities, such as his invocation of
national security to justify tariffs on imported steel and aluminum,57 could be a precedent for
imposing a border carbon adjustment on imports from countries lacking equivalent climate
policies. If upheld by the courts, such action would protect domestic manufacturers from foreign
competitors located in countries with lax limits on GHG emissions. In its cap-and-trade program,

56

For policy reasons, EPA may elect to regulate through quality standards, but not to prohibit,
interstate emission-reduction offsets because the legal rationale for prohibiting this category of offsets could
also apply to interstate trading of emission allowances.
57
E.g., Presidential Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States (March
8, 2018) (online at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-adjustingimports-aluminum-united-states/).
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California awards free allowances to in-state manufacturers for “leakage prevention.”58 This would
be an option states could consider under Section 115 to protect against leakage and unfair
international competition. Ultimately, a hybrid approach – under which the federal government
imposes a border carbon adjustment on imports from countries without comparable GHG controls
and states award free allowances for emissions attributable to exports to these countries – might
provide the most comprehensive response to leakage and competitiveness concerns.

10.4. INTEGRATION WITH SECTION 111 AND OTHER CLEAN AIR
ACT AUTHORITIES
While Section 115 can be a powerful provision, it is only one of the authorities EPA and
other federal agencies can use to reduce U.S. GHG emissions. Many of these authorities could be
combined in complementary ways. Motor vehicle standards under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act
and Department of Energy appliance efficiency standards would support state compliance with
Section 115 by making it easier for states to achieve their emission reduction targets. Federal
programs to reduce emissions from diffuse, hard-to-measure sources, such as the agricultural
sector or oil and gas wells, could be a more effective way to control these emissions than through
Section 115. Special consideration, however, may be needed to harmonize Section 115 with
regulations reducing emissions from large existing stationary sources under Section 111(d). Both
Section 115 and Section 111(d) require the adoption of implementation plans by states. It would
significantly ease administrative burdens on states and compliance obligations by regulated
sources if states could promulgate a single plan complying with both sets of requirements.
The Clean Power Plan (CPP) promulgated by the Obama EPA provides a model for how a
Section 111(d) rule for existing power plants could be harmonized with action under Section 115
such that a state could use its Section 115 SIP to comply with Section 111(d). In the preamble to the
CPP, EPA described how California could use its state cap-and-trade program to comply with
Section 111(d) by demonstrating that the state program would achieve at least equivalent emission
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reductions from existing power plants.59 EPA could use this approach as a template for allowing
any state to use its Section 115 SIP revision to comply with the requirements of both Section 115
and Section 111(d). In fact, EPA could simplify this process for states by developing a Section 115
model rule that would be presumptively approvable under both Section 115 and Section 111(d).

11. CONCLUSION
The analysis introduced here, and more thoroughly described in our book, Combating
Climate Change with Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, demonstrates that Section 115 grants EPA the
authority to regulate GHG emissions to address the climate crisis.

In fact, there is a strong

argument that EPA has not only the authority but also a mandatory duty to regulate GHG
emissions under Section 115.60 Section 115 states that the Administrator “shall” act when certain
conditions are met, and this language is consistently interpreted by courts to create
nondiscretionary duties.61 As the preconditions for action under Section 115 have been met, the
courts could be called on to compel action.
Leaving aside whether EPA must act under Section 115, however, there are excellent
reasons for an administration to choose to do so. This unutilized but potent source of federal
authority provides an avenue to achieve significant GHG emissions reductions through revisions
to state implementation plans. EPA could, in a single rulemaking, address emissions from multiple
major sources in a manner that integrates with other regulatory approaches at the federal and state
level. Depending on the policy preferences of the administration, it could be used by itself or in
conjunction with an array of other initiatives to achieve deep and continuing reductions in GHG
emissions, consistent with our international commitments, in an effective, efficient, and equitable
manner.
59
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A Section 115 climate rule would stand on a firm legal foundation. Section 115 would
operate no differently with respect to greenhouse gases than any other air pollutant. The criteria
for acting under Section 115 – foreign endangerment and reciprocity – can be satisfied. EPA’s SIP
calls would be shaped by statutory constraints that bound agency discretion without undermining
the effectiveness of Section 115. Consistent with cooperative federalism, states would make the key
implementation decisions, but could be guided by a federal model rule.
For the world to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, the United States will once
again have to show global leadership. This will require taking aggressive action on the domestic
front and using that to inspire reciprocal efforts by other nations. Section 115 provides the legal
authority to do just that.
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